This study constructs a model of a monopoly where investors are also actors, and shows that, in contrast to traditional models, this model admits the welfare improvement caused by monopoly. This study also reveals that if a huge income gap exists in the initial stage, then monopoly exacerbates the expansion of the income gap caused by market trades. Moreover, we show that this exacerbation occurs in general situations under some additional (but natural) assumptions.
Introduction
Economics traditionally considers a monopoly to be bad for an economy. The most famous research indicating that monopolies are bad is the classical partial equilibrium analysis performed by Hicks [1] . This research indicates that a monopoly lowers the total surplus, and thus, the economy with a monopoly is not Pareto efficient. The result of this research is summerized in most of the textbook in microeconomics, e.g. Varian (1992) , Okuno (2008) or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) [2] - [4] .
This research focuses on monopoly from a fresh perspective. The traditional monopoly model includes two characters: the monopolistic firm and the consumer. However, a real monopolistic situation necessarily involves a third character, namely, the investor. Under capitalism, investors are also consumers. Therefore, in our model, consumers invest in the monopolistic firm, which distributes its profit into its investors.
We formalize the above circumstance in a model, and analyze its model. We find that the total surplus of an economy may improve under a monopoly, which contradicts the traditional rationale for monopolies being bad. Meanwhile, in such a case the income gap often is expanded by market trade. If the initial income gap is suffi-ciently large, then a monopoly exacerbates this expansion of the income gap. The reason for this is as follows. Consider there are two consumers, where one is poor and another is rich. Both consumers invest in a firm that sells their own products and transfers its margin to investors in the form of dividends. However, the poor consumer has only limited ability to invest, and thus receives only a small share of the margin on product sales. The bulk of the margin is expropriated by the rich consumer. In this scenario, monopoly exacerbates this expansion of the income gap by enlarging firm's profit. This is the case in which the initial income gap is very high. In the case where the initial income gap is not so high, under certain assumptions monopoly also exacerbate the expansion of the income gap. Although these assumptions are not clear in the theoretical sense, we believe that these assumptions are intuitively natural.
In Section 2, we introduce our model and show the results. Section 3 is the conclusion.
The Model
We construct two models 
The second-stage is different from each model. In model 1, each consumer and firm participates in the competitive market and the equilibrium arises. In model 2, the firm determines the price of consumption p monopolistically and the wage w is determined competitively 1 .
The First Model
First, we solve the second-stage. The first-order condition of consumer i is, 
and, 2. L = Hence, the equilibrium price is
In the second-stage, we assume that the consumption space of each consumer is + ×   . This assumption is made for tha sake of simplicity and is not essential. We note that this setup is introduced in the explanation of the quasi-linear preference in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
Next, the first-order condition of the firm is,
Thus, the equilibrium wage is
where the subscript 1 represents that it is the profit of the first model. Hence,
is positive, and the aver-
Therefore, the payoff function of this model
simultaneously and the Nash equilibrium arises.
Hence, . a a K + = Note that K* is the social optimal level of capital, since ( )
, a a and thus ( ) ( ) ( )
We show the following proposition:
There exists a Nash equilibrium ( )
is the unique Nash equilibrium. If not, then for any Nash equilibrium ( ) 
To show that * * , 2 2
is in fact a Nash equilibrium, consider the function ( )
is the best response to , e a is a Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof.
The Second Model
The demand function of consumer i on private consumption is simply ( ) ( )
Hence, the total demand is ( ) ( )
Now, we introduce an assumption. ASSUMPTION 1: For any 0 K > , there exists
By first-order condition, we have
is the unique value such that ( ) 1 2 , 2 c c F K + = . Thus, in equilibrium, the profit of the firm is
Then, the payoff function of this model
We want to focus on the case where the equilibrium of the first stage is well-defined. Therefore, we introduce an additional assumption:
Here, we provide a sufficient condition of ASSUMPTION 2 to show this assumption is not too strong. . This example demonstrates that the existence of the case where monopoly improves the total surplus.
Comparative Statics
First, we argue the following result. 
